On Designing an ACL2-Based C Integer Type Safety Checking Tool

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Consider the Truth Value

- if(x > -10) { // do something important }
 - C source code
 - x represents a positive integer between 1 and 10 inclusive
- Truth is Dependent on the Integer Type of x
 - If x is an unsigned int type, then "do something important" would not be executed
 - If x is an unsigned integer type with a smaller precision than that
 of an unsigned int,, then 'do something important' would
 be executed

Integer Error Conditions

- Overflow/Underflow
 - Occurs whenever the value of an integer type is increased or decreased beyond the type's valid value range
 - unsigned integers silently wrap
 - * behavior for signed integers is undefined
- Sign error
 - Occurs whenever the meaning of the high order bit is lost
 - ❖ A precision bit
 - ❖ A sign bit
- Truncation Error
 - Occurs during the coercion from a larger type to a smaller type and the high order bits are truncated
 - ♦ 11111111 → 1111

Static C Typing Semantics

- Syntax of Types
 - - < < scalar-type > := < arithmetic-type > | < pointer-type >
 - Shows subtyping relationships necessary for C coercion rules
- Typing Inference Rules Based on Operator/Operand Constraints
 - Typing judgments of the form $\Gamma \vdash E : \theta$
 - Where E is an expression, Γ is the type environment, and θ is the type attributed to E
 - For example, the multiplicative division operation

Example Output

C is Weakly Typed and is Not Type Safe

- Type Strength
 - A language characteristic based on the amount of coercion (casting) permitted and performed among its data types
 - Less coercions = stronger typing
 - Coercion is generally performed during compile time to insure compatibility of operator and operand types
 - C integer coercions are rule based
 - Integer ranking
 - Integer promotion rules
 - Usual arithmetic conversions
 - C does not support valid range checking during the coercion process
- Type Safety
 - A program property of being free from unexpected results
 - Unexpected results = compromised system state
 - Compromised system state = vulnerable to attacks and/or failure
 - Denial of Service
 - Execution of Arbitrary Code
 - Escalation of Privileges

Project Tasks

- Formalize C's Static Typing Semantics
- Construct Tool Around Formal Static Typing Semantics
- Prove Assumptions Made About Both are Correct

ACL2

- A Computational Logic
 - First order theorem prover
- Applicative Common Lisp
 - Non-destructive programming language

Tool Functionality

- Input AST and .symtab from c2acl2 Translator
- First Pass:
 - Extract, model, and model declarations
 - ❖ (SYM ("NAME") ((TYPE) (QUAL) (STORE)) (VALUE))
 - updatable lookup table
- Second and Subsequent Passes:
 - Analyze Expressions and Statements
 - Check operator/operand compatibility
 - If error found, issue and append error statement
 - Check promoted operand values
 - If error found, issue and append error statement
 - If an assignment expression
 - Evaluate RHS first and LHS second
 - ➤ If new LHS value can be determined, validate value and add to lookup table
 - If value cannot be determined, issue a conditional warning
 - If value is in error, append error statement which remains until next assignment statement.
- Proof Generation

